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The global biodiversity is in decline because modern societies are organized for that purpose. The design,
implementation and enforcement of international, regional and national environmental policies have not
helped to reverse the trend. In our paper, we analyze the hardship of protecting the gray wolf in Finland,
the big-leaf mahogany in Peru, and the Amur tiger in Russia. Our comparative approach is based on the
old institutional economics, and our key concept – the unit of analysis – is a transaction, i.e. enactment,
practice and transfer of formal and informal rights to future beneﬁts. Transactions challenge, disturb
and re-organize the existing institutional scaffold. William Connolly (The Fragility of Things, 2013) and
Terrence Deacon (Incomplete Nature, 2012) have recently argued that teleodynamics, the purposeful and
end-directed behaviors and the reactions and disturbances in other related ententional behaviors are key
to understand not only the dynamics of institutional change per se but also, and especially so, the emer-
gent patterns of behavior resulting from resistance and adaptation. These teleodynamic consequences
reveal the problems in institutional ﬁt, i.e. how the institutional arrangements, particular customary cir-
cumstances and habitual actors ﬁt together. We abduct three types of emerging order springing from the
reactions to national biodiversity policies: (i) the practice of faking the institutional ﬁt, (ii) the practice of
disobedience; and, (iii) willingness to take part in the making of new institutional arrangements. These
vary according to the purpose, working rules (set of rights) and motivation. We explain the interrelated
meaning of purpose, working rules and motivation in the context of institutional ﬁt in detail. In our cases,
the ﬁt is not exactly the one envisioned through the authoritative rules and the purpose of institutional
conservation, but it is anordernevertheless, and that order is not necessarily good for endangered species.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access article under the CCntroduction
Biodiversity is declining globally (Butchart et al. 2010). Themost
mportant proximate reasons for this decline are the rapid trans-
ormation and loss of habitats (Dornelas et al. 2014; Hanski 2005;
ooney & Mace 2008), and many species also suffer from direct
arvest or eradication of their individuals from the wild (Salo et al.
014), either as a by-product or deliberately. This can occur for
arious reasons, most common of which are the use value of these
pecies (Newton 2008) or their perceived harm to human liveli-
ood (Bisi et al. 2007; Inskip & Zimmermann 2009). The continuous
ecline in biodiversity is associatedwith serious global problems in
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +358 503638109.
E-mail address: juha.hiedanpaa@luke.ﬁ (J. Hiedanpää).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2015.04.001
617-1381/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access artic
.0/).BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
creating biodiversity policies, implementing them, and convincing
industries and people to commit to them (Hiedanpää et al. 2011).
To explore the challenges of institutional design and implemen-
tation related to biodiversity conservation, we analyze three cases
from three different countries showing varying mixtures of fail-
ure and success for the envisioned species conservation goals. Our
cases include theprotectionof thegraywolf (Canis lupus) in Finland,
the big-leaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) in Peru, and the
Amur tiger (Panthera tigris altaica) in Russia. Environmental change
threatens all three species in our analysis, and each of the cases also
poses a unique combination of underlying reasons for direct human
pressure.
Our comparative approach examines the interplay of biodi-
versity policy and civil society and how societal arrangements
for biodiversity affect and change the administrative rules and
livelihoods. This task was also encouraged by the United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) Rio+20 meeting.
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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n a Brundtlandian pathway, the UNCSD expressed its hope that
e [the representatives of States] “with the full participationof civil
ociety, renew our commitment to sustainable development and
o ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and envi-
onmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and
uture generations.” (UNCSD 2012, 2).
Our focus is on policy design and implementation and the con-
equent failures and surprises in species-level conservation. Our
tarting point is the seminal work of Young (2002, 2008) on insti-
utional ﬁt. According to Young (2008, 20), effective institutional
rrangements need tomatchwell the deﬁning features of the prob-
em they address. He (2008, 29) continues, “[b]ut no one should
e under any illusion that strengthening [organizations] can solve
hese problems in the absence of effective efforts to get the under-
ying institutions right.” Sen would criticize this as transcendental
nstitutionalism. Sen (2010, 6) argues that “in searching for per-
ection, transcendental institutionalism concentrates primarily on
etting institutions right, and it is not directly focused on the
ctual societies that would ultimately emerge.” The actual emerg-
ng societies are given our critical attention here. We will apply
lassical institutional economics (Bromley 2006; Commons 1990)
nd the comparative realization-oriented approach developed by
en (1999, 2010).
he problem
Our threeexempliﬁednation-states representverydifferent tra-
itions in terms of how each society is organized for economic
rovisioning. Their cultures, economies, andpolitical and economic
nstitutions vary, and so do their positions on the global geopolit-
cal map of biodiversity concern. However, in the face of a global
iodiversity crisis, national institutional setups and the principles
f their functioning have been under rather uniform pressures in
ach of these countries. International treaties, such as the Conven-
ion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
nd Flora (CITES), the Bern Convention, and the Convention on Bio-
ogical Diversity (CBD), have increasingly established the basis for
ational conservation legislation. The speciﬁc national implemen-
ation processes of supranational rulings have invariably given rise
o resistance and adaptive reactions in the three case countries.
hese international agreements have led to national disagreements
ith distinctive dynamics of (dis)agreement. These disagreements,
n turn, have been associated with varying success in the conserva-
ion of the target species.
Finland is a liberal social-democratic Nordic country with a
undred years’ tradition of representative democracy and strong
onﬁdence inanuncorruptedgovernment. Finnishnatural environ-
ents are mostly relatively species-poor boreal forests, in which
he graywolf was fairly common until the 1880s, afterwhich it was
rogressively hunted to virtual extinction by the 1920s. The erad-
cation of wolves was actively promoted by the state, e.g., through
ounties offered to wolf hunters. The recovery of wolves started
uring the 1970s and was initially based on individuals migrat-
ng from the Soviet Union. Although stringent protection measures
ave been implemented since Finland’s accession to the European
nion in 1995, the Finnishwolf population is currently (as ofwinter
013–2014) between 135 and 155 individuals and, after 35 years
f protection, is not considered viable. Several real problems have
merged regardinghowthe strict protectionof thewolf is designed,
mplemented, and enforced.
Peru is situated within the institutional history of the Andean
mazonian countries. It is implementing an ongoing political
ecentralization process in the context of a liberal market econ-
my. Peru is a megadiverse country with vast tropical rainforests
Mittermeier et al. 1997). Big-leaf mahogany is the most soughtConservation 26 (2015) 36–44 37
after of the Neotropical hardwoods, and its vast historic range
stretches from Mexico to southern Amazonia. During the past
decades, the specieswas logged to commercial extinction in practi-
cally all of its former range, except for in isolated rainforest areas in
parts of Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru (Blundell & Gullison 2003; Grogan
et al. 2010). Active conservationmeasures, particularly through the
CITES, have been implemented in Peru during the last ten years and
have been accompanied by decreases in both economic beneﬁts
from mahogany logging and harvest levels (Lombardi Indacochea
2013).
Russia represents a post-socialist state, and its huge size has
resulted in high overall biodiversity, although large parts of the
country are composed of lower-diversity boreal, subarctic, and arc-
tic environments. The Russian population of the Amur (Siberian)
tiger, which is one of the ﬁve subspecies of tiger (Nam 2005), is one
of the best known examples of biodiversity under threat in the Rus-
sian Federation. The Amur tiger population saw its low in the 1940s
when it was close to extinction, with 40 individuals remaining in
the wild. Because of the implementation of anti-poaching efforts
and other conservation measures in Russia, the Amur tiger pop-
ulation has recovered and is currently at approximately 400–450
individuals (Nam 2005; WWF Russia 2013).
In each of these cases, the purpose of the authoritative will has
been to safeguard the existence of a species. The authorities have
tried, with varying success, to establish a conservation status for
the threatened species in question. The policy makers have faced
resistance or adaptive reactionswhendesigning and implementing
these policies.
The transactional approach to rights
Young (2002) has articulated the problems posed by envi-
ronmental policies in terms of institutional ﬁt and interplay.
Institutional ﬁt refers to how societal arrangements ﬁt the envi-
ronmental problems they are intended to solve. The question
concerning interplay is a question of how well different insti-
tutional arrangements work together in deﬁning and solving
environmental problems. For Young (2008, 20), institutions are the
rights, rules, and decision-making procedures that guide and chan-
nel human behavior and interactions with the social and natural
environments.
Young does not pay much attention to how institutions ﬁt with
already existing societal structures and processes (Vatn & Vedeld
2012). Indeed, when looking closer at problems of institutional ﬁt,
one key feature seems to be a gap between the intentions of the
policy planners and the already existing societal structures and
processes. According to the existing literature on institutions, this
gap can be understood as a difference between formal and infor-
mal rules (North 2005), friction between the formal institutions
and the organizational routines (Hodgson 1993; Nelson & Winter
1982) or, mentioned divide between the transcendental and the
realization-oriented institutionalism (Sen 2010).
Our objective is to make sense of what the gap actually is and
what happens in the gap. We do this by following institutional eco-
nomics andmaking transaction our unit of analysis (Ramstad 1996;
Rutherford 1994). According to Greif (2006, 46), a transaction is
“an action taken when an entity, such as commodity, social atti-
tude, emotion, or information is transferred from one social unit to
another.” Transactions are always exercised for a purpose, for the
sake of something, in order for some still absent state of affairs to
become present. This approach to transactions brings the dynamic
correlate of the right, power, to the theory and subsequent analy-
sis (Commons 1990, 1995). According to Flathman (1976), it is the
actual practice of rights thatmakes rights effective,meaningful and
signiﬁcant.
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Institutional ﬁt and misﬁt become the properties of purpose
nd power, resistance and adaptation. Our hypothesis is that bio-
iversity policies often fall short because the policy-makers fail
o acknowledge the very particular and situational ways in which
nstitutional design and policy implementation disturb the estab-
ished rights already in place and create conditions for emergent
henomena. Not only the institutional economics or the men-
ioned critical liberals, also the theories of self-organizing systems
rovide grounds for understanding the complex dynamics of inter-
ependency, conﬂicts of interest and order (Byrne & Callaghan
013, 217–222; Hodgson 2004, 50–53). The theory laid down
ere suggests why this happens. Our purpose here is to expli-
ate how it might happen. The ﬁndings will have practical policy
mplications.
Our researchstrategy is abductive (Bromley2006;Paavola2004;
eirce 1955, 150–156; Peirce 1997). We will begin with a rule,
escribe the result, and infer the case. The general rule is that
a) institutional misﬁt disturbs already existing rights or triggers
ew rights to emerge. By this general rule, we derive our results
y answering the following empirical question: (b) What kinds
f reactions – resistance and adaptive actions – have institutional
djustments and policies for the conservation of our case species
riggered in Finland, Peru, and Russia? From the rule and empirical
esults, we infer our theoretical case: (c) how to explain an emer-
ent order that springs from the reactive and creative expressions
f power in our three case study contexts.
aterials
Legal and policy documents concerning the conservation of
he three species constitute the primary empirical material for
his study. In Finland, our research materials are, ﬁrst, the docu-
ents deployed by the government of Finland and the European
ommission during the infringement Procedure (2001–2005) (see
iedanpää & Bromley 2011). Second, the national wolf policy doc-
ments produced by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and
innish Wildlife agency were utilized. Third, the written reactions
y the wolf-critical civil society, especially the association called
aajamasusi were used as research material. The interpretative
ork on written documents is grounded on thirty two open-ended
heme interviews conducted on the SW-Finnish wolf territories.
he themes were (i) emotional aspects, (ii) reactions and actions
s well as resistance and struggle in the face of the presence of
he gray wolf, and (iii) suggested local solutions to the policy and
anagement problems. The interviews were conducted during
011–2013.
In Peru, as a starting point, we used laws, decrees and other rul-
ngs issued by the Peruvian government, as well as reports and
ther documents prepared by the country’s relevant ministries.
econd, we analyzed the reporting and documents prepared by
he Peruvian CITES scientiﬁc authority for big-leaf mahogany (Fac-
lty of Forest Sciences, Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina).
hird, we analyzed documents produced by non-governmental
rganizations (NGOs) such as the Environmental Investigation
gency and other international organizations such as the Inter-
ational Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). The topic has also
een addressed in a number of scientiﬁc articles which we
lso use as primary research material. In addition to the pri-
ary materials, the interpretation of the Peruvian case draws on
he second author’s experiences accumulated through ﬁeldwork
peciﬁcally related to the country’s forest sector reform, carried
ut in Peruvian Amazonia during annual visits from 2005 to the
resent.
For Russia, the research material consists of publicly available
ocuments provided by the authorities and non-governmentalConservation 26 (2015) 36–44
organizations. The Russian branch of the international non-
governmental environmental organization Worldwide Fund for
Nature (WWF) has worked in collaboration with the Russian
Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology in the 2000s to pro-
duce an outline and action plan for the protection of the tiger in
the Russian Far East. Such cooperation became commonplace in
the country after the reduction of the capacities of environmental
authorities and their constant reorganization with the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. We have also utilized material that has been
published by WWF Russia on the protection of the tiger. These data
provideacomprehensiveview into the formal institutionsdesigned
to help with tiger conservation, but also insights into the informal
institutions and transactions hindering tiger protection. We read
through this material with the aim of sorting out and abstract-
ing the institutional setups and problems that can be identiﬁed in
conservation efforts.
Dynamics of reactions
The gray wolf in Finland
WhenFinlandentered theEuropeanUnion in1995, its challenge
was to incorporate the European secondary legislation, such as the
Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC), into its national
legislation, e.g., Finland needed to incorporate the strict protection
of the wolf into the Hunting Act. The strict protection of the wolf
has been resisted in many ways. The opposition has manifested
itself on different scales of governance, but perhaps most point-
edly, the government of Finland initially encountered difﬁculties
obeying the European Union’s Habitats Directive. Finland tried to
retain the national power in wolf policy issues.
The European Commission initiated an Infringement Proce-
dure (2001–2005), in which the Finnish case appeared ﬁrst to
be that of non-conformity but later was found to be a bad
application. The exact words of the Habitats Directive need not
appear in national statutes, but the spirit and meaning of the
Directive must not, however, be in doubt. The Directive stip-
ulates that derogation from strict protection is possible when
“especially signiﬁcant damages” are caused, whereas the Finnish
Hunting Statute referred only to “damage.” In the Finnish Hunting
Statute, there were two other similar instances. As the pro-
ceedings began, the government of Finland admitted difﬁculties
in phrasing and revised the Hunting Statute to bring the lan-
guage into conformity with the Directive in the summer of 2001
(for documentation, see Hiedanpää & Bromley 2011; Borgström
2012).
Authorities in Finland displayed obedience to the European rule
of law and commitment to wolf protection by preparing a wolf
management plan during the last stage of the infringement proce-
dure (MAF2005). TheHabitatsDirective encouragesmember states
to produce amanagement plan, but doing so is not compulsory. The
preparationprocess involvedexperts, stakeholders, and thegeneral
public (Bisi & Kurki 2008), and during the process, the number of
wolves increased considerably, peaking at almost 250 individuals
in 2007 (Kojola et al. 2011).
Despite this effort, the Commission called Finland to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2005. The ECJ gave its judgment in
2007, and Finland was found guilty of non-selective hunting of
gray wolves in 2007. The judgment explicated the regional wildlife
administration’s problematic practices concerning the derogation.
The other two charges, i.e., that Finland had not explored alterna-
tive non-lethal methods and that the level of the population size of
the wolf was not favorable, were dismissed. The resistance to Euro-
pean rules had shifted from the governmental level to the regional
administrative level (European 2007).
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In response to this judgment, in 2008, Finland decentral-
zed decisions concerning the derogation to the regional level
nd also outside of the hunting season to expedite the process
nd execute regional expertise concerning local circumstances
Metsästysasetus 2008). The purpose of this institutional adjust-
entwas to increase the sizeof thewolfpopulation thathadstarted
o decline in the winter 2007/2008. However, the wolf population
ize continued todecline. Theadministrationwasnot theonlyparty
t fault. It was conﬁrmed that there were no natural causes for
he decline since 2006, thus, the only warranted explanation was
hat wolves had been illegally killed. As the government and the
ildlife administration improved their actions in the face of EU
ressure, the rural communities reacted and started to take the
ight into their own hands. The rural communities addressed the
olf problem by managing the population size by their own means
Kojola et al. 2011). However, social sustainability of this kind is not
dmired by the Commission or the Finnish wildlife administration
Hiedanpää et al. 2012).
As the number of wolves continued to decline, the Commis-
ion began an informal discussion with Finland in the fall of 2009
egarding the illegal killings of wolves. In response to this and
o the previously issued ECJ judgment, the Finnish government
ntroduced three legislative revisions. First, the category of severe
unting crime came into force in April 2011 (Criminal Code 2011).
his adjustment allowed police-enforced tele-monitoring of sus-
ects and introduced the threat of a minimum of four months
nd a maximum of four years in prison. Second, the government
ulti-folded the nominal values of large carnivores, especially
he wolf (MAF Decree 2010). Third, the government recentral-
zed decisions concerning the derogation to the national level, to
he Finnish Wildlife Agency (FWA) in 2011. In addition, the new
ildlife and Game Administration Act (2011/158) introduced the
egional Wildlife Councils (RWC). The RWC is a formal organiza-
ion constituted by up to ten members, six of whom are hunters
nd the rest of whom are representatives of landowners, police,
egional land use planners, and trafﬁc administration. The task of
he RWC is to direct regional wildlife policy. Recall that the former
oard of directors of Game Management Districts held the power
o make decisions concerning the derogation. The right and power
o make decisions regarding the life and the death of the wolf were
emoved from the local level.
In December 2011, thirteen parents’ associations of primary
chools in SW Finland organized a petition to the Ministry of the
nvironment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Min-
stry of Internal Security, and the Finnish Wildlife Agency (Parental
ssociations 2011). For them, the Finnish wolf policy did not make
ense because the wolf’s habits were secured, whereas people’s
veryday lives were not. According to the association Taajama-
usi (“Peri-urban wolf”), organized by an active member of the
arents’ associations in the spring of 2012, in densely populated
reas, such as SW Finland, the wolves tended to be located in the
rong places. According to the association, it was both norma-
ively and morally wrong that the right of the wolf preceded that of
umans.
In response to the complaints fromcivil society, the government
assed the “yardwolf decree” in the spring of 2013 (MAF2013). The
overnment created a new category according to which the dero-
ation could happen; according to this decree, a yard wolf does not
ecessarily cause damages or present an acute threat to human
afety, but the repetitive and continuous presence of the species
reates a potential danger to humans. The ﬁrst evaluation con-
erning the need to apply such license was given to the RWC. The
riticism prevailed because the FWA made the decision according
o EU-based rules and procedures of derogation. Some new powers
nd rights were re-assigned to the local level, but there were no
ractical implications of this change because it was not any easierConservation 26 (2015) 36–44 39
to kill a wolf. Conﬂicts about the rights of the people, the wolf and
the administration continue.
The big-leaf mahogany in Peru
The ﬁrst Peruvian efforts to protectmahogany date back to 1930
(Peru 2008; UNALM-ITTO 2009, p. 21), but until the turn of the
millennium, such efforts produced limited results. Only the recent
reform of the Peruvian forest regime (Salo et al. 2011, 2013) has
given concrete attention tobig-leafmahogany. In2000, Perupassed
a new forest law (Law 27308), including a 10-year ban against
mahogany logging in several Amazonian river basins.
The Peruvian forest industry resisted the new rules and often
received tacit support from the authorities;when the regulations of
the forest lawwerepassed in2001, themahoganybanswere largely
ignored (EIA 2012). In many parts of the country, the timber indus-
tryalsomanaged todelay the implementationof thenewforest law,
and loggers took advantage of the prevailing confusion by using
fraudulent or otherwise unlawfully established contracts to extract
considerable volumes of valuable timber, including mahogany
(Blundell & Gullison 2003; EIA 2012). Because of factors such as
difﬁcult accessibility, dynamic and diverse environments (Salo &
Toivonen 2009), an unstable normative framework (Smith et al.
2006), and the difﬁculty of law enforcement (EIA 2012; Sears &
Pinedo-Vasquez, 2011), a high level of economic risk is present in
Amazonian timber extraction, and thus, the industry claimed that
any new rules should be adjusted to this local context, habitually
referred to as “the Amazonian reality” (Salo et al. 2013).
In 2001, growing international pressure forced Peru to add
mahogany to the CITES Appendix III (Grogan & Barreto 2005), and
in 2002, mahogany was listed in the CITES Appendix II, against the
will of the main mahogany-producing countries of Bolivia, Brazil,
and Peru (Blundell & Gullison 2003). In Peru, the opposition to the
listing was particularly strong in the Amazonian timber industry
but nevertheless the listing took effect in 2003. However, reliable
information was still lacking regarding the legal status of Peru-
vian mahogany shipments and the country’s mahogany stocks and
harvest levels (Grogan & Schulze 2008; Kometter et al. 2004).
In the early 2000s, Peru was the world’s leading wild mahogany
exporter, and the industry was booming. Although the ofﬁcial
exports soon decreased, from over 50,000m3 in 2002 to 30,000m3
in 2004 (Lombardi Indacochea 2013), the dwindling stocks and
mounting international pressure ﬁnally forced Peru to implement
export quotas in 2005 (Youatt & Cmar 2009). Soon, the CITES Stand-
ing Committee for mahogany ordered a drastic reduction of the
quota from over 23,000m3 in 2006 to less than 5000m3 in 2007
(Ibid).
In 2007, the Peru–US Free Trade Agreement was amended to
improve Peruvian forest governance. This, however, coincidedwith
the delegation of decision-making rights from the Peruvian central
government to regional governments, thusweakening the enforce-
ment capacities of the forest authorities (EIA 2012). In 2008, the
main importer of Peruvian mahogany, the US, modiﬁed its import
legislation, obliging the importers to verify the legal origin of tim-
ber (Youatt & Cmar 2009). That same year, the Peruvian mahogany
export quota became based on the number of trees felled and not
just the timber volume.
Despite the new forest legislation and mahogany’s status as a
CITES Appendix II species, old habits well adapted to the “Ama-
zonian reality” have shown resilience. Sears and Pinedo-Vásquez
stress the importance of relationships between different actors and
the adaptation of these actors to the new Peruvian forest regime
(Sears & Pinedo-Vasquez, 2011). The complexity inherent in the
timber production chain is exacerbated by the administrative steps
required to govern that chain. One related adaptation has been
the expansion of a group of forest consultants that help move the
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imber through the legal jungle (Sears & Pinedo-Vasquez, 2011).
hese professionals are often ex-ofﬁcials of forest authorities or
nvironmental NGOs with ﬁrst-hand information on the adminis-
rative apparatus, including its weaknesses.
There are many ways to fake compliance with the rules. First,
ore trees than the number authorized can be felled by inﬂating
he volume of timber obtained from authorized fellings. Second,
ogging documents for real trees can be traded to fell unauthorized
rees elsewhere. Third, fabricated inventories can be used to trade
ocuments for felling trees (EIA 2010). The ﬁrst method has now
een made more difﬁcult to implement by the use of tree quotas
nd by an incipient revision of conversion factors from the standing
olume, whereas the latter two methods are increasingly targeted
y ground-truthing missions to verify stumps. The Peruvian Crim-
nal Code was also modiﬁed in 2009 to harden sanctions for illegal
ogging, including expansion of the deﬁnition of logging so that it
ncompasses not just extraction but rather the whole commodity
hain.
The struggle over dwindling mahogany stocks remained heated
s compliance with the rules was increasingly monitored in the
eld. As the results of monitoring started to be revealed, the inter-
ational CITES authorities chose their wording about the Peruvian
ituation carefully. Peru was said to have taken important steps
orward, but the status of mahogany’s commodity chain was still
ubious. At the same time, another international organization, the
S-based Environmental Investigation Agency, was closely follow-
ng mahogany extraction and trade and collecting data for a report
hatwould denounce the forest industry on the basis ofwidespread
raud (EIA 2012). Also Finer et al. (2014) found that during the last
ecade the majority of Peruvian forest concessions have been sus-
ected of serious violations of the forest law by the authorities.
lmost a thirdof all concessioncontractshavebeencanceledon this
asis. Only a minor part of all violations are related to mahogany,
owever.
In 2010, the CITES Standing Committee notiﬁed Peru that
lthough the country had made efforts in controlling the legal
rigin of logged mahogany (lawful acquisition ﬁndings), Peru’s
ompliance in protecting the species (non-detriment ﬁndings) was
uestionable. The Committee gave Peru an ultimatum: failing to
how real compliance would lead to the suspension of export trade
n Peruvian mahogany. In 2011, CITES acknowledged Peru’s efforts
n the matter, and exports continued. During the last few years, the
ontrol and monitoring of mahogany harvest have improved. The
eriﬁcation of all mahogany trees prior to felling, and their stumps
fter felling,hasbecome increasingly feasible, and for theyear2013,
he felling of only 236 trees in a total of nine sites was authorized
Lombardi Indacochea 2013). At the same time, ofﬁcially recorded
ahogany-based revenues have shrunk. It is likely, however, that
ahogany is also exported completely illegally by being identiﬁed
s some other timber species, as has been shown in Brazil (Chimeli
Boyd 2010).
he Amur tiger in Russia
The Amur tiger population is located in the Russian Far East,
n the Primorsk Krai and Khabarovsk Krai regions, between the
hinese border and the Sea of Japan. The area the tigers inhabit
oday covers approximately 180,000km2 (Ministerstvoprirodnykh
esursov i ekologii Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2010). Hunting tigers
as a habit amongst Russian settlers until the early 21st cen-
ury, although it was culturally banned among native inhabitants.
he species had become almost extinct when the Soviet Union
ommitted itself to conservation of the species in 1947, and hunt-
ng was criminalized. Formally, the right to kill was transferred
rom the locals to the state. The population gradually recovered to
each approximately 400 individuals by the 1970s. However, theConservation 26 (2015) 36–44
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused the population to
dwindle again because of erosion of the institutions enforcing con-
servation measures. The inability to control the human impact on
tiger populations led to the transfer of de facto rights, in practice,
back to theunofﬁcial sphere, and illegalhunting forﬁnancial beneﬁt
increased.
During the 1990s, transnational non-governmental organiza-
tions assumed a leading role in tiger conservation by establishing
tiger conservation programs in the Russian Far East. For the WWF
ofﬁce in Vladivostok, preserving the Amur tiger was a primary
goal before forest protection was implemented (Tysiachniouk &
Reisman 2006), and the WWF gradually turned its efforts to pre-
venting illegal logging that it saw as a severe threat to the tiger
population. This involvement of NGOs is in line with the more
general trend in post-Soviet Russia of NGOs substituting for gov-
ernmental structures innature conservation (Yanitsky2012). There
have also been coalitions between NGOs and governmental bodies.
The population of the tiger has settled at approximately 450 indi-
viduals. The conservation of the tiger is now a global concern, and
13Asian nations joined forceswith the heads of their governments,
who signed an agreement at a meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, in
November 2010 (Deklaratsiya glav pravitel’stv o sokhranenii tigra
2010). The Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Rus-
sian Federation published, in 2010, a strategy for the protection of
the Amur tiger in the Russian Federation (Ministerstvo prirodnykh
resursov i ekologii Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2010). In sum, the con-
servation of the tiger is a top concern. It is also clear that this
charismatic species is seen to provide added value for the promo-
tion of political ends.
Nevertheless, the Amur tiger population is currently considered
threatened because of poaching and habitat loss. Speciﬁcally, the
main problems are the poaching of tigers and their prey, increased
logging, the construction of roads, forest ﬁres, and inadequate law
enforcement (WWF Russia 2013). Poaching results from the desire
to use tiger parts in traditional Chinese medicine and, to a lesser
extent, the threat that tigers pose to people in rural communi-
ties and to domestic and game animals. Therefore, whereas in the
case of Russia, we may not observe resistance toward conservation
measures from the government, we do see resistance in the life-
worlds of groups of settlers in the regions where the tiger lives.
Overall, resistance to conservation emerges either from the human
population that is in daily conﬂictwith the tiger (i.e., threat) or from
the desire to use the tiger for economically and culturally desirable
purposes (i.e., illegal use in traditional medicine). That is, the rea-
sons for objection to the protection of the tiger stem, ﬁrst, from
a desire to eliminate the species, and second, from objection-in-
practice that does not aim to exterminate the species but rather
intends to use individuals of the species for economic beneﬁt. As
objection, the latter is unintentional: the results of the process of
killing individuals tend to lead toward extinction, without that
being the aim of the people practicing the killings. Habitat loss
is a severe threat for conservation measures, as logging of the
forests that the tiger inhabits is a common practice (Tysiachniouk
& Reisman 2006).
As a speciﬁc problem, conservation efforts in the region inhabi-
ted by the Amur tiger are hindered by its location at the border
near China and North Korea. In other words, discontinuities in
various formal and informal institutions create inefﬁciencies in
conservation measures. The poaching and selling of tiger parts
from the Russian side of the border to China are facilitated by
the lack of effective administrative systems and transboundary
collaboration mechanisms (Nam 2005). As the border areas are
politically sensitive, the nature reserve employees are not able to
monitor tigers that freely cross the border. Nevertheless, cooper-
ation between Russia and China on surveying the Amur tiger and
its habitat dates back to 1997, and there has been an attempt to
J. Hiedanpää et al. / Journal for Nature Conservation 26 (2015) 36–44 41
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(ig. 1. Our hypothesis: the alleged gap between formal and informal institutions is
he actual right with the potential right, producing surprising dynamics and a preca
hat affects the outcomes of policy interventions.
reate a Transboundary Biosphere Reserve to aid nature conserva-
ion; UNESCO and several NGOs are participating and seeking the
nvolvement of local communities and regional authorities.
On the local scale, partly encouraged by these organizations,
everal efforts have been made that can be seen as further adapta-
ion to the pressure to improve conservation practices. Festivities
edicated to the tiger have been revitalized, and schools have orga-
ized programs hailing the tiger as a worthy species and the tigers
s worthy individuals. It is worth emphasizing that much of this
ind of adaptation to conservation goals draws from local habits,
hereby drawing a full circle to more original ideas on the qualities
f the tiger, that is, a just and totemic animal rather than a modern-
ay type of target for conservation organizations on the one hand
nd a kill for poaching on the other hand.
Overall, in the long run, a process is underway in which rights
ave been rescaled several times. These rights include not only
he right to kill an individual of a species but also the right to
revent the killing of any individual. The right to kill tiger individ-
als was ﬁrst scaled up from the local scale, and then, in practice,
as transferred to unofﬁcial networks that utilize tiger individuals
or culturally and economically useful purposes. The responsibil-
ty of preventing killing, in contrast, ﬁrst existed at the scale of the
entral state administration, but then shifted to transnational con-
ervation organization networks and top-level political processes.
uring these transformations that determine the right to tiger indi-
iduals, the gap that exists between ofﬁcial rules and unofﬁcial
ractices has also been on the move; it has been relocated from
xisting between state institutions and local communities to a gap
etween rules created by conservation organizations and networks
f poachers.
he emerging order
Our abductive task is to explain the case in the circumstances
escribed above, that is,what occurs in the gap between formal and
nformal institutions when “new actual society is emerging”, para-
hrasing Sen (2010, 6). According to Connolly (2013) and Deacon
2012), teleodynamics, the purposeful and end-directed behaviorswith the contingent emergent order. Power relationships in reactions intermingle
order. The tightness or looseness of the deﬁned rules and rights may form a factor
and the reactions anddisturbances triggered by these behaviors are
a key to understand not only the dynamics of institutional change
per se but also, and especially so, the emergent patterns of behav-
ior resulting from resistance and adaptation. In what follows, we
elaborate this in more detail.
Faking the institutional ﬁt
As our empirical case studies show, on many occasions, trans-
actions build upon faking. In such cases, the actors abide to the
formal requirements brought about by biodiversity policies and
their implementation but nevertheless undermine the purpose of
conservation as long as the rules are not overtly violated, a behavior
called “afﬁrmative slippage” or “creative compliance” (e.g. Farber
1999; McBarnet 2001). Therefore, the continuity of the actions
working against the conservation status of the species is secured
through an ostensible acceptance of the working rules. This accep-
tance conceals the lack of motivation to pursue the purpose of
conservation (Fig. 1). Faking may, of course, require collateral or
even joint action: civil society actors fake the fulﬁllment of for-
mal requirements, and authorities fake veriﬁcation, which requires
that actors combine powers to act against the purpose of the biodi-
versity policy in question. Transactions constituting the intended
regulatory regimecan, for example, be renegotiatedby the involved
actors giving rise to something completely different (Farber 1999).
This is similar, but not equal, to what Young says about institu-
tional arrangements,which, to be effective, “mustmakea transition
from paper to practice” (Young 2008, 21). Collective faking builds
on a moral agreement, commitment to fake and in all our case
studies, the state plays a role in this moral agreement. When civil
society actors are motivated to follow the new rules on paper and
theauthorities alsomonitor theirpracticesonpaper, theactors con-
duct business as usual, which is camouﬂaged to look like command
and obedience. Sometimes faking can be “perfectly legal” (when
the creative compliance is based on ﬁnding real loopholes in the
working rules) but often it takes place on the margins or beyond
what is allowed by the rules. Licenses to derogate that are issued
to a greater extent than the wolf populations can bear, fraudulent
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ogging contracts that areusedonly as a smokescreen for indiscrim-
nate extraction, and overlooked habitat alteration that threatens
he protected species show how the authorities and their civil soci-
ty counterparts only follow the formal institutional scaffoldingbut
o not contribute to the policy purpose.
This lack of abidance can result in hunters and loggers increas-
ngly engaging in the administrative system, seeking authorization
or activities that, under deeper scrutiny, conﬂict with the con-
ervation purpose. But as the authorities often have no means or
o motivation to control, e.g., whether the wolves killed or the
ahogany felled were the authorized ones or whether the particu-
ar logging activities carried out in the tiger territories have affected
he animals, the conservation policy implementation is dubious.
ecause the state still plays a part in the moral agreement, the
odes for institutional adjustment change constantly. In Finland, for
xample, the judiciary system is pursuing its ﬁrst charges of wolf-
elated severe hunting crime, and Peru has hardened its criminal
ode for cases of illegal logging.
Although legislative reformoftendoesnot incorporate theexist-
ngpraxis of howpeople and companies operate, an inverse process
an take place where many of these actors are not motivated to
hange their logic of behavior; instead, they strive for compli-
nce with formalities, making only a partial transition from paper
o practice. Then, when the working rules progressively tighten
oward lower levels of decision-making, the customs, conven-
ions, and discourses that supported the pre-intervention praxis
ecome endangered by the new rules. However, they can still adapt
nd survive through this kind of creative self-organization that
s fundamentally based on the intricate links between the local
nvironment and local practices (Salo et al. 2013; Sears & Pinedo-
asquez, 2011).
isobedience and institutional misﬁt
The situation described above has also led to other types of
eactions. In particular, when, as in our case studies, control and
anctions are either too weak to function well or very stringent,
ritical civil society actors (and sometimes also the administrative
ctors) may refuse to abide to the working rules altogether. Thus,
he actors conform to the customary codes of conduct already in
lace, and disengage from the rulings of the regulators perceived
ocially distant (Murphy et al. 2009). The enforcement of working
ules without the motivation of the actors then directs pressure
oward resistance and the purpose of improving the conservation
tatus of the target species is questioned. The illegal killers of gray
olves have continued their illegal activities because they have
ecome committed to the customary rules associated with get-
ing rid of the wolves and not to the goal of conservation. Instead,
hewolf-critical citizens aremotivated to pointing out institutional
ailures and weeding out the formal constraints to gain support for
heir purpose. Thus, to conform to customs is to conform to the
tandard that is publicly approved and praised. People also tend to
isengage from the regulatory system when they feel a lack of pro-
edural justice, i.e. they perceive that the regulator is mistreating
hem in some way (Murphy et al. 2009).
In some cases, disobedience has reigned, particularly when the
llegal sphere of society has expanded, such as in Russia after the
ollapse of the Soviet Union and under the subsequent disorganiza-
ion and continuous reorganization of state structures in the 1990s
Feldman & Blokov 2012; Yanitsky 2012). In Peruvian Amazonia,
he deﬁcient monitoring, control, and enforcement capacity of the
uthorities have contributed to the loggers’ rejection of the conser-
ation purpose of non-detrimentality and have also caused many
orestry actors to ignore the formal rules that outline lawful acqui-
ition. However, when control and enforcement become stricter, orConservation 26 (2015) 36–44
the species in question become increasingly scarce, the economic
beneﬁt streams are also curtailed.
Collective disobedience also takes place in stable societal condi-
tionswithhigh levelsof rule-of-law, suchas the situation inFinland.
The critics of thewolf conservation policy are against the principles
of justice and legitimacy on which the institutional design and pol-
icy implementation are based. In contrast to the cases of mahogany
and the Amur tiger, in the case of the wolf, the highly publicized
emotional regime is ﬁercely against the institutional purpose of
protection and the rules bywhich the species has been given a priv-
ileged status compared to the status of human life and livelihood
(Hiedanpää2013). Illegal killings of thewolf aredone for thebeneﬁt
of fellow humans on the wolf territories (Peltola et al. 2013; Pohja-
Mykrä & Kurki 2014). Actions are altruistic, exercised not only for
sympathy but are committed for the good of others (on sympathy
and commitment, see Sen 2002, 177). Under these circumstances,
civil society activists openly conform to a customary moral code
that existed before thewolfmade its reappearance (after a hundred
years of exile) and practically all of the networking, feed-forward,
and creative collective action has worked against the presence of
the gray wolf, with a deﬁnitive lack of support for the implementa-
tion of the Habitats Directive (on networking and feed-forward see
Ormerod 2012). There are no civil society initiatives to solve the
puzzle of co-existence. Disobedience and the negative emotions
of anger and frustration support institutional entrepreneurship or
intellectual or moral growth in the presence of the wolf as little as
does organized crime in the case of illegal logging of mahogany or
poaching of Amur tigers. These reactions encourage distrust and
hostility among civil society, government administration, and the
scientiﬁc community.
Institutional ﬁt in the making
As our case studies indicate, most actors have been rather criti-
cal of the authoritarian intention of establishing working rules for
conservation, and most collective action has worked against con-
servation. There is, however, certain willingness and a degree of
motivation from some actors to improve the institutional arrange-
ments for conservation. In contrast to the acts of faking,which show
motivationonly toabide to formal rules andconformto thecustom-
ary code in the face of institutional failure, here we witness actions
that aim to “make a transition from practice to paper” and thus
signal new rights that are being created, parallel with the work-
ing rules deemed inadequate for the job at hand. However, such
actions of institutional entrepreneurship are incipient and even
non-existent at times.
As an analogy, 15 years ago in Finland, the planning and imple-
mentation of the Natura 2000 network triggered, on the country
scale, amassive grassroots resistance (Hiedanpää& Bromley 2012).
This resistance, in turn, caused a major reorientation in the prac-
tices of regional land and natural resource use planning. Planners
anddecisionmakersposed the followingquestion:whatwouldbea
workableway around the conﬂict?As a response, the regional-level
authorities initiateda spontaneous series of collaborativeprocesses
whose general purpose was to explore the conditions of combining
biodiversity protection and forest use. As a consequence, a volun-
tary, ﬁxed-time payment scheme for ecosystem services known as
Natural Values Trading was designed and tested, and several key
principles were later incorporated into the national forest legisla-
tion (Author 2012).
The same voluntary and incentive-based principles have now
been brought to thewolf policy discussion (Orava 2013). In Finland,
the state and its administration have started to react to the dis-
obedience, anger, and distrust that the wolf policy has triggered
and consequently the Finnish wolf management plan was updated
in 2014. The wildlife administration framed the updating process
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s ‘wolf territory politics.’ As tentatively articulated, the purpose
f territory politics is to anchor the managerial activities on the
erritory level and collaboratively design voluntary incentives to
ive with the wolves. These alleged incentives are not so much eco-
omic as they aremoral by their nature. Thewildlife administration
as realized the bad societal and ecological consequences of too
ight working rules regarding wolf management. The purpose now
s to strengthen the individual motivation and moral commitment
o wolf protection by encouraging people in the wolf territories to
raft initiatives and policies (Turun Sanomat 18.4.2014). The focus
f future policy will be more on practical managerial transactions
hose purpose is to identify limiting factors and improve the con-
itions of co-existence: the shift is toward voluntary action and
ersuasion.Consequently the institutionalperformanceandﬁtmay
mprove (see also Hiedanpää & Bromley 2011).
This same general point of interest has emerged in the Peru-
ian and Russian cases. To combat the problems related to the
onservation ofmahogany and the Amur tiger, cross-sectoral coop-
ration has emerged that is speciﬁcally linked to the protection of
hese ﬂagship species. For example, the Russian government has
een cooperatingwith the non-governmental sphere to protect the
mur tiger, and the role of WWF Russia continues to be strong
n tiger protection (Ministerstvo prirodnykh resursov i ekologii
ossiyskoy Federatsii 2010). In contrast to the case of the wolf, and
n line with the case of mahogany, the main goal of poaching Amur
igers is not to eliminate the species; the aim of the poaching is to
arn ﬁnancial beneﬁts, and thus, decreasing the animal population
hould be seen as resource depletion and not a beneﬁt for hunt-
ng communities. Moreover, on a higher level, the species has high
tatus value. For these reasons, many of the interactions between
umans and the tiger could be categorized as adaptations toward
reservation strategies.
Thus far, there is little evidence of working mechanisms that
ould provide incentives for long-term mahogany management.
nstead, and in contrast to the cases of the gray wolf and the Amur
iger, measures regulating the harvest of mahogany occur in a set-
ing in which the species is one of many species that share similar
cological and economic characteristics. Thus, the pressure caused
y the tightening regulation and control of mahogany extraction
as a natural safety valve: the extraction of other species, including
nother CITES-listed species, the Spanish cedar (Cedrela odorata).
his could potentially provide space and time for new incentives to
otivate actors to conserve the mahogany and the livelihoods and
ellbeing of the communities living in these forest environments.
onclusions
The nature of environmental and biodiversity policy is that it is
ontested by multitude of actors from governments all the way to
takeholders and citizens. Biodiversity policy planning, implemen-
ation and enforcement evoke reactions, and these reactions do not
lways improve the institutional ﬁt. The opposite is often the case.
hat there are reactions to proposed institutional designs is not
he news. However, the types of emergent orders we identiﬁed are
ovel.
We have identiﬁed three emergent orders, the ways in which
ocieties and their institutional scaffolding actually constitute
hemselves. First, when faking institutional ﬁt, there is a set of
stablished rights that are pursued through an established proce-
ural apparatus (that fulﬁlls the needs of the actors). The balance of
oweramong theactorsdoesnot indicate theneed fornewrights or
ules. The rights themselves, and not the purpose, occupy the cen-
er of attention. Second,when the reaction comprises disobedience
nd feelings of injustice, there are no rights that are pursued given
he balance of power among the actors. Any action or effort thatConservation 26 (2015) 36–44 43
occurs does not center around emerging rights but rather involves
the suppression of (institutional) constraints. Third, when the ﬁt
institutions are in the making, civil society actors are empowered
to engage in the creation of new rights. The rights occupy the center
of attention but stem directly from the purpose of conservation.
We have illustrated problematic consequences of an insensi-
tive institutional scaffolding and design, i.e., increasingly stringent
enforcement of a conservation-oriented policy apparatus with
clear conservation goals but without a clear role for the creative
participation of civil society. Major consequences have included
resistance and self-directed adaptations to institutional constraints
rather than motivation to pursue the overt goal of these institu-
tional arrangements. Institutions have come from above, and the
conditions of their ﬁtness have been generated from below. As our
cases show, the ﬁt is not exactly the one envisioned through the
authoritative rules and the purpose of institutional conservation,
but it is a ﬁt nevertheless, and that ﬁt is not necessarily good for
endangered species.
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